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BOOK REVIEW
11

A FASCINATION WITHOUT SCRUPLESu: AMERICAN
POPULAR CULTURE AND ITS CORROSIVE IMPACT ON
THE LAW
When.Law Goes Pop: The V anishlng Line

Between Law and Popular Culture.
By Richard K. Sherwin
c ·h icago: The University of Chicago Press. 2000.
325 pp. $27.00.
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*

nThe culture of law's rule needs to be studied in the same way
as other cultures. Each has its founding· myths, its ne.c essary
beliefs, and its reasons that are internal to its own norms."1

uobviously, anyone of minimal intelligence over the age of
four can- more or less- grasp the basic cpntent of a ·film,
record, ra.dio, or television program without any special
training. Yet precisely because the media so very closely
mimic reality, we apprehend them much more easily than we
11
comprehend them... . [The] film and the electronic media have
drastically changed the way we perceive the world .... " [Y]et(
we all too naturally accept the vast amounts of information
they convey to us in massive doses without questioning .... ~~2

I.

INTRODUCTION

fu When Law Goes Pop3, New York Law School Professor
Richard K. Sherwin formulates a cultural4 and instrumentalist
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S. 1973, University of
.P ennsylvania (Wharton School); J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School. I dedicate this
essay to Teresa}. Faherty
1 PAUL

W.

KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCfiNC LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP 1 (1999).
2 }AMES MONACO, HOW TO READ A FILM: THE ART, TECHNOLOGY, LANGUAG:S,
HisrORY, AND THEoRY OF FILM AND MEDIA vii (1981).
3 RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOFS.POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000).
4

Among the multiple possible meanings of culture, the most relevant in
understanding Professor Shenvin's book iS a social-anthropological definition. In
this regard, a good definition is as follows:
Cultures ... as defined by their differences, not from nature or animal
societies, but from each other .... A culture denotes a distirtcl, historic
group of people C. a society together with all its tools, artifacts,
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6

which he says

posses.s ions, and characteristic ways and conceptions of life . . . . Built
into it are various presuppositions:
a. A culture is not a heap of unrelated phenomena, but an organic
whole, so that eath feature of it, however obvious its biological
explanation, also has meaning in relation to the others.
b. So far as its features are unique, or, if shared with other cultures,
so transformed by their context as to "meanH somf!thing
substantially different, it too is unique.
·
c. It is extended in time, a.s it must be to be transmissible between

generations (even an emergent culture has emerged from
something).
d. It is also conscious of the fact; so that it conceives itself (in
varying degrees) jn terms of the past, present and future.
e. In all of the foregoing respects a culture resembles an indiv~dual,
and thus possesses a quasi-personal identity~. even though its selfconscious~ess may be located nowhere but in the minds of its
individual members, and though it may lack any unitary will.
f. Though a response to circumstances (some of them of its own
creation), a culture is a spontaneous growth . . . and (unlike a
purely sociopolitical ord.e r) cannot be invented, planned or
imposed.
A COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 100 (David E. Cooper, ed. 1995) hereinafter
AEsrHErtcs] (emphasis added).
s Instrumentalist, or furtctual, theories of art presuppose that art serves functions
for social purposes. See AFSI"HEI'ICS; supra note 4, at 6. An instrumenU.list theory
then, opposes aesthetic docbines of art whereby art shoulcj be valued for itself
alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve . . . . Id.
His~orically. the idea. of art ~or art's sa~e is associated wi~ the cult of beauty,
which had tts roots 1ll Kantian aesthetics and the Romantic movement . . . . Id.
The history of instrumentalist/ functional art theory is fascinating, and
has a very long and distinguished history C one that begins with Plato
and has persisted in a variety of forms to the present day. The opposing
idea that genuine art is n~n-functional, that it is always autonomous
and is produced merely for its own sakel is a comparatively recent
invention.
The distinction between the useful arts (or crafts) and arts that serve no
purpos.e and are att~nded to so_lel.Y as ends in ~emsely-es is not ~v be
found m Plato or Aristotle; nor ts It to be found :m medteval theones of
art. It was only at the time of the Renaissance that the notion of fine art
began to take root as a way of distinguishing the functional from the
non-functional arts. Up until then, all of what we now call fine art was
considered to have. a purpose C although in the case of some art forms
like music and decoration the precise nature of its function was
specified only with difficulty.
Functional views of art take at least two distinct fortns. Som.e are
normative and insist that art ought always to serve a specified function.
To the extent that a work of art performs itS designated. function, it is
considered meritorious; reciprocally, when a work fails to serve 'i ts
function it is considered inadequate or bad ... referred to as normative
functionalism. Descriptive functionalism, by contrast, contends that by
thef.r very nature works of art serve certain metaphysical, psychological, or
cultural functions, and do so whether or not the artist knows or intends it.
Descriptive fun(:tionalism treats a particular function as a necessary
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is "driven ... by the felt need to acknowledge the vicissitudes
1
of the irrational"7 while avoiding American popular culture s
obsession with "punitive retribution" in response to "the
predatory other; " the 'alien' among us, the perennial favorite of
film and TV .... "8
Sherwin's thesis is that while law has always been "shot
9
through with [popular] fiction/' by virtue of equitable maxirns
11
and ancient rhetorical teachings, in recent years (l]egal
meanings [have been] flattening out· as they yield to the
compelling visual logic of film and TV images and the market
forces that fuel their production. "10 Accordingly, in Sherwin's
view, law has become a "spectacle", like society in general11,
and as "[a] consequence, the customary balance within the legal
system among .d isparate forms of knowledge, discourse, and
power is under great strain, and is at risk of breaking down." 12
Sherwin concludes that "what we are seeing today is no
ordinary intermingling of law and popular culture, but a more
generalized erosion of law's legitintacy," because "(t]his is what
happens when law goes pop. "13
'When Law Goes· Pop on one level is an exposition of what
21st century American culture finds persuasive and compelling
as opposed to boring and inconsequential Part II of this Essay,
feature of all art; although it is true that both descriptive and normative
functionalists are generally quite happy to allow that particular works
of art may contingently serve a function on a certain occasion C where
this function is entirely unrelated to its status as art.
I d. at 162-63 (emphasis added; selected emphasis in the original).
6 Se~ SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 9. See COOPER, supra note 4 at 260-64 for a
synthesis of this proposed jurisprudence.
·
·
7 SHERWIN, supra note 3 at 9.
s Id.
9 Id. at 3.
10 ld. at 4 (end note omitted).
11 ld. at 265, n.4 (citing GUY DEBORD, THE 5oaETY OF SPECTACLE (1995), among
other sources).
t2 ld. at 4-5. Sherwin provides two illustrations of this strain: the virtues of the
lay jury as a practical reflection of community values, expectations, and beliefs
a.nd the virtues of judicial expertise and prudence being negatively impacted by
what he calls the homogenous stories and images of popular culture. I d. at 5. He
goes on to observe, in this regard:
It .is what happens when the active, off screen dimension of lived
experience and the varieties of common sense that it produces give way
to the passive, self-gratification-enhancing, and image-based logic of
commercial media. Then, the capacity for critical judgment of external
reality, of self and others, of truth and justice in the individual case, and
of the media themselves Cis significantly undercut.
Id. (endnote omitted).
13 Id. (original emphasis).
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therefore, discusses three key themes of Sherwin's book: (a) the
problem of persuasion in a postmodem society14, (b) the
problem of understanding and dealing with the "jurisprudence
of appearances,"15 and (c) the problem of popular culture's
illicit impact on legal advocacy16_
Professor Sherwin's account, however, is more than a
cautionary run1ination on popular culture and legal meaningmaking. It is also a reflection, albeit disjointed and dense at
times17, on the respective roles of objectivity versus subjectivity
in legal judgment.18 Accordingly, Part III of this Essay explores
various notions of legal indeterminacy embedded in Sherwin's
text. 19
II. WHAT'S HOT/WHAT'S NOT?
The Problem of Persuasion in a Post-Modern Society
Three outstanding books, published and revised over the
last two decades, have had a dramatic impact on
understanding the au courant art and practice of social
persuasion, each within different, albeit overlapping, spheres.2°
The first book is Thomas A. Mauet's Trial Techniques.21 Mauet's
book is a standard text in many law school courses on trial
advocacy; in the sphere of law this book has taught thousands
of American lawyers the basics of trial preparation22 and

A.

See infra notes 20-78 and accompanying text.
1s See infra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. Sherwin defines this concept as
a form of legal meaning making that adopts the media's visual logic as its own.
SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 10.
16 See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
17 According to the New York Times: Unfortunately, reading Sherwin is no day
at the movies. His book is often irksomely repetitive, numbingly abstract and
studded with hermetic jargon like hyper real and the esthetics of deliberate
norntative construction.
PAOLA. WEISSMAN, Book Rev. Yo, Your Honor!, N.Y. TIMES 40 (Dec. 10, 2000), at
40.
1
ts Indeed, one of the most edifying features of Sherwin s book is the way it
stimulates one to think of the parallels between aesthetic judgment and legal
judgment. See infra notes 109..121 and accompanying text.
19 Id.
2o For other interesting and informative literature on various aspects of
persuasion and rhetoric see AA Brief Primer on Rhetorical Theory" in Robert F.
Blomquist, The Trial of William Jefferson Clinton: Impartial Justice, The Court of
Impeachment and Ranked Vignettes of Praiseworthy Senatorial Rhetoric, 84 MARQ. L.
REv. 383, 398-402 (2000).
21 THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES (4th ed. 1996).
14

22

Professor Mauet notes:
My experiences as a trial lawyer and trial advocacy teacher have made
me realize that effective trial lawyers always seem to have two
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strategy. 23 In this regard, Mauet discusses the re·a lity that
11
U]ury trials are the princip.a l method by which . we resolve
legal disputes parties cannot settle themselves through less
formal methods," 24 the differentiated roles of the judge, the
jury, and the advocates within the American trial scheme2S, and
the fourfold tools ''the litigants have, and [their lawyers] must
understand" in influencing the outcome of trial. 26
complimentary abilities. First~ they have developed an effective method
for analyzing and preparing each case for trial. Second, they have the
technical skills necessary to present their side of a case persuasively
during trial. It is the combination of both qualities C preparation and
execution C that produces effective trial advocacy.
This text approaches trial advocacy the same way. It presents a method
of trial preparation and reviews the thought processes a trial lawyer
uses before and during each phase of a trial. In addition, it discusses
and gives examples of the basic teclurical courtroom skills that must be
developed to present evidence and arguments persuasively to the jury.
This is done in the firm belief that effective trial advocacy is both an art
and a skill, and that while a few trial lawyers may be hom, most are
made. Artistry becomes possible only after basic skills have become
mastered.
Id. at xix. Mauet's book consists of ten chapters which discuss, in broad terms,
the following topics of trial preparation and teclmique: jury sele·ction, opening
statements, direct examination, exhibits, cross-examination, experts, closing
arguments, objections, and trial prepe)ration and strategy. Id.
·
23 Mauet devotes a substantial portion of his final chapter to strategic
considerations of a trial. For Mauet trial strategy boils down to eight key factors:
(1) develop[ing] a persuasive theory of the case; (2) develop[mg] persuasive
themes; (3) develop[ing] persuasive labels for people, places, [and]. events; (4)
identify[ing] the key disputed issues; (5) develop[ing] ... important facts on the
disputed issues; (6) persu[ing] only what [can] realistically [be] accomplish[ed];
(7) anticipat[ing] [the] opponent's strategy; and (8) anticipat[ing] problems and
weaknesses. ld. at 497.
24 ld. at 1. Mauet goes on to point out: Although alternative dispute resolution
methods such as arbitration, mediation; summary trials, private trials, and the
like are becoming increasingly important, jury trials in the federal and . state
courts remain the most important dispute--r esolving method in the United States. ·
Id. For some re<:ent scholarship on alternative dispute resolution in America, and
a sampling of othe.r interesting and infortnative li~erature on various aspects of
persuasion and rhetoric see the discussion and sources cited in Robert F.
Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and (Ve-ry Brief) Pragmatic Observations on
Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution in America, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 343,
343-50 (2000).
25 MAUEr, supra note 21, at 1.
26 Jd. at 1-2.. Mauet observes:
In our jury trial system, the jury determines the facts, the judge
determines the law, and the lawyers act as advocates for the litigants.
Our adversary system is premised on the belief that pitting two
advers~es against each other, with each interested in pres.e nting her
version of the truth, is the best way for the jury to determine the
probable truth. The tools the litigants have, and must understand, are
fourfold; substantive law, procedural law, evidence law, and persuasion
law. The first three, being principally legal, can be learned in a few
years. The last, the psychology of persuasion, is what fascinates true trial
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A second noteworthy book on the art and practice of
persuasion is Robert B. Cialdini's Influence: The Psychology of
. Persuasion27• This best-selling28 book. is on the syllabi of several
· undergraduate and graduate business schools; within the
sphere of advertising and marketing, Cialdini's text has
influenced media professionals and sales executives who
peddle everything from automobiles to soap to political
candidates.29 Cialdini's book consists of what he characterizes
as a "shtdy of compliance."30 The impetus for his study is
humorous but interesting. As he explains:
With personally disquieting frequency, I have always found
myself in possession of unwanted magazine subscriptions or
tickets to the sanitation workers' ball. Probably this longstanding status as sucker accounts for my interest in the study
of compliance: Just what are the factors that cause one person
to say yes to another person? And which techniques most
effectively use these factors to bring about such compliance? I
wondered why it is that a request stated in a certain way will
be rejected, while a request that asks for the same favor in a
slightly different fashion will be successfuJ.31

Cialdini identifies and discusses six "weapons of
influence"32 that exploit "a fundamental psychological principle
that directs human behavior and, in so doing, gives the tactics
11
their power. 33 These persuasive weapons consist, according to
Cialdini, of: (1) reciprocation, used with great effectiveness by
the Hari Krishna Society in airports during the 1970s, whereby
humans believe nthat we should try to repay, in kind, what
another person has provided us;" 34 (2) commitment and
lawyers, and they spend a lifetime learning about, and learning how to
apply, psychology in the courtroom.
I d. (emphasis added).

·

B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (rev. ed. 1993).
According to the back cover, with more than one quarter of a million copies

27 ROBERT
28

sold worldwide, Influence has established itself as the most important book on
persuasion ever published. Id.
29 See e.g, }OE MCGINNISS~ THE SELLING OF 1HE PRESIDENT (1969); l<IKU ADAITO,
PICTURE PERFECT: THE ART AND ARTIFACE OF PuBLIC IMAGE-MAKING (1993);
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PREsiDENCY (Simon & Schuster, Inc.,

1969)(1992) (As an example of recent books on the specific province of political
advertising).
30 CIALDINI, supra note 27, at xi.
31 ld; Cf. ROGER FISHER& WILUAM URY, GEri'ING TO YES (1981).
'32 CIALDINI, supra note 27, at 1-16.
33 Id. at xiii.
34 I d. at 17. Professor Cialdini expounds on this first principle of persuasion by
noting:
H a woman does us a favor, we should do her one in return; if a man
sends us a birthday present, we should remember his birthday with a
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consistency, explaining why people who bet on a horse at the

racetrack "are much more confident of their horse's chances of
winning than they are intmediately before laying down that
bet;"35 (3) social proof, which causes people to assess correct
behavior by "find[ing] out what other people think is correct;"36
(4) liking, the chief influence on Tupperware partygoers who
"buy from ... a friend rather than an . . . own salesperson;"37
(5) authority, the "deep-seated sense of duty to authority within
_gift of our own; if a .c ouple. invites us to ·a _p arty, we should be sure to
invite them to one of ours. By virtue of the reciprocity rule, then, we are
obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the
like. So typical is it for indebtedness to accompany the receipt of such
things that a term like much obliged has become a synonym for thank
you, not only in the English language but in others as well.
ld. at 18 (original emphasis).
35 Id. at 57. Oaldini points out that prominent psychological theorists have,
viewed the desire for consistency as, a central motivator of our behavior and that
A[t]he drive to be (and look) consistent .c onstitutes a highly potent weapon of
social influence, often causing us to act in ways that are clearly contrary to our
own best interests. I d. at 59. ·
3,6 I d. at 116. The social logic of this weapon of influence is as follows:
We view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree
that we see others performing it. Whether the question is what to do
with an empty popcorn box in a movie theater, how fast to drive on a
certain stretch of highway, or how to eat the chicken at a dinner party,
the, actions of those around us will be important in defining the answer.
'

.

]d.

at 168., As Cialdini observes, however, the psychological dynamics of a
Tupperware party are impacted by several weapons · of influence the
quihtessential American compliance setting:
Anybody familiar .with the workings of a Tupperware party will
recognize the use of the varioUs weapons of influence ... : reciprocity (to
start, games are played and prizes won by the partygoers; anyone who
doesn't win a prize gets to reach into a grab bag for hers so that
everyone has received a gift before the buying_ begins), commitment
(each participant is urged to describe publicly the uses and benefits she
has found irt the Tupperware she already owns), and social proof (once
the buying b~gins, each purchase builds the idea that other, similar
people want the product, therefore, it must be good).
All the major weapons of influence are present to help things along, but
37 Id.

the real pOUJer of the Tupperware party ,comes from a pa.rticular ,arrangement
that trades on the liking rule. Despite the entertaining and persuasive
salesmanship of the Tupperware demonstrator, the true requests to
purchase tht:! product does not come from this stranger; it comes from a
friend to every woman in the room. Oh, the Tupperware r~presentative
may physically ask for each partygoer's order, all r~ght, b.ut the more

psychologically compelling requester is a housewife sitting off to the side~.
smiling, chatting, and serving refreshments. She is the party hostess; who has
called her friends together for the demonstration in her home and who,
everyone knows, makes a profit from each piece sold at her party.
Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added). Liking is a powerful persuader in jury trials. As
Clarence ,Darrow once said: The main work of a trial attorney is to make a jury
like his client. ld. at 167.
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us all"38 such that even symbols of authority like the late actor
Robert Young who played a physician on a popular television
show selling Sanka brand coffee with the quasi-medicinal
message "the 100% Real Coffee that lets you be your best;"39
and (6) scarcity, whereby if something is characterized as "rare
or beconling rare" it is generally perceived to be valuable. 40
Finally, James Monaco's How to Read a Film: The Art,
Technology, LAnguage, History and Theory of Film and Media, 41
viewed by many as the basic book on film and media,42 is a
third exceptional book that examines the culture of persuasion
by focusing on fi1In and other visual media.43 Monaco informs
us along these lines that "[f]ilm is not a language in the sense
that English, French, or mathematics is,"44 because filn1 has no
gramntati.cal conventions and nit is not necessary to learn a
114
vocabulary. 5
Indeed, "[i]nfants appear to understand
38
39

I d. at 213.
Id. at 221. Indeed,
There are several kinds of symbols that can reliably trigger our
compliance in the absence of the genuine substance of authority.
Consequently, they are employed extensively by those compliance
professionals who are short on substance. Con artists, for example,
drape themselves with the titles, clothes, and trappings of authority.
They love nothing more than to emerge elegantly dressed from a fine
automobile and to introduce themselves to their prospective mark as
Doctor or Judge or Professor or Commissioner Someone. They
understand that when they are so equipped, their chances for
compliance are greatly increased.

Id.
40

ld. at 239.
Collectors of everything from baseball cards to antiques are keenly
aware of the influence of the scarcity principle in deterntining the worth
of an item.... -E specially enlightening as to the importance of scarcity in
the collectibles market is the phenomenon of the precious mistake.
Flawed items C a blurred stamp or a double-struck coin C are
sometimes the most valued of all....With the scarcity principle
operating so powerfully on the worth we assign things, it is natural that
compliance professionals will do some related operating of their own~
Probably the most straightforward use of the scarcity principle occurs in
the limited-number tactic, when the customer is informed that a certain
product is in short supply that cannot be guaranteed to last long.

Id.
41
42

supra note 2.
Id., dust jacket.

MONACO,

Monaco's book is divided into six chapters: (1) Film as an Art, (2) Technology:
Image and Sound, {3) The language of Film: Signs and S ntax, (4) The Shape of
Film History, (5) Film Theory: Form and Function, and (6 Media. His book also
contains three appendices: (I) A Standard Glossary for Film and Media Criticism,
(II) Reading About Film and Media, and (III) Film and Media: A Chronology. Id.
at xiii-xv.
44 Id. at 121.
45 Id.
43
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television images, fot example, months before they begin to
develop a facility with spoken Ianguage;"46 moreover, "[e]ven
11
47
cats watch television." Thus, it is not necessary to acquire
intellectual competence in film in order to appreciate it, at least
on the most basic level. "48 Nevertheless, as Monaco asserts,
there are varying gradations of sophistication in understanding
and interpreting visual media and, therefore, "film is very
much like Ianguage"49 because:
People who are highly experienced in filtn, highly literate
11
1
visually (or should we say Cinemate f?), see more and hear
more than people who seldom go to the movies. An education
in the quasi-language of film opens up greater potential
meaning for the observer, so it- is useful to use the metaphor of
language to describe the phenomenon of film. so

Accordingly, research has established that film images are
comprehended differently by children than by adults, and that
th.ere are "-c ultural differences in [the] perception of images."51
Monaco concludes that film images must be "read": "There is a
process
of intellection occurring
not necessarily
consciously when we observe an image, and it follows that
we must have learned, at some point, how to do this."52
Similarly, according to Monaco, the process of visual
media "perception and comprehension involves the brain: it is
a mental experience as well as a physical one,"53 and "there is a
strong element of our ability to observe images, whether still or
11
moving, that depends on learning .54 Interestingly, Monaco
p.o sits that the reason why film and TV images are
psychologically so compelling and persuasive is that a. visual
image does not "suggest'' 55 as an author or speaker suggests by
choosing certain words, which semiologists call "signifiers."
Si . · ·ers" are the collection of letters or sounds that require
hard intellectual work in translating into a ntt:mber of possible

49

Id .
Id.
Id.
Id.

50

Jd.

46
.47
48

Id. Monaco summarizes some relevant research on cultural differences in the
perception of film imag~s: In one famous 19~0s test, anthropolo~ist William
Hudson set out to examme whether rural Afrtcans who had had little contact
with Western culture perceived depth in two-dimensional images the same way
that Europeans do. He found unequivocally, that they do not. Id~
52 ld. at 122.
53 I d. at 123.
54 Id.
ss Id. at 128.
51

..

.
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si · ieds," which are meanings that the words or sounds
represent56 Rather, according to Monaco, a visual i111age
11
"states. 57 The political risk to a culture presented by visual
images, then, is that it is easy to watch a film, for example, and
not do the difficult mental work of translating si · iers into
si · ·eds. As Monaco explains:
·
11

[F]ilm is like a language. How, then, does it do what it does?
Clearly, one person's image of a certain object is not another's.
If we both read the words "rose.. you may perhaps think of a
Peace rose you picked last summei, while I am thinking of the
one [a former girlfriend] gave to me in December 1968. In
cinema, however, we both see the same rose, while the
filmn1aker can choose from an infinite variety of roses and then
photograph the one chosen in another infinite variety of ways.
The artist's choice in cinema is without limit; the artist's choice
in literature is circumscribed, while the reverse is true for the
observer. Film does not suggest in this context: it states. And
therein lies its power and the danger it poses to the observer:
the reason why it is useful, even vital, to learn to read images
well so that the observer can seize some of the power of the
medium. The better one reads an image, the more one
understands it, the more power one has over it. The reader of
a page invents the image, the reader of a film does not, yet
both readers must work to interpret the signs they perceive in

order to complete the process of intellection. The more work
they do, the better the balance between observer and creator in
the process; the better the balance, the more vital and resonant
the work of art.ss

The integrated insights of Mauet, Cialdini, and Monaco
provide a solid intellectual foundation for exploring the key
epistemological theories of When Law Goes Pop. The crux of
Professor Sherwin's lament in When Law Goes Pop might be
phrased in the following terms: we are all postmodernists now.
In the first place, in Sherwin•s view, Americans are quite aware
at the outset of the 21st century that all reality is "constructed"
11
and that there is no such thing as ideal truth" or no such thing
as "objectivist rationality" in the philosophical tradition of Plato
and Descartes.59 As Sherwin puts it
If it is all being constructed, we can hear postmodern anxiety
whisper, isn't one construction as true (or as false) as any
other? This fear is fueled by advances in communication
technology that increasingly blur the line between fiction and
reality (from digitally manipulated photography and videos to

Id. at 127.
57 ld. at 128.
ss Id. (emphasis in original).
59 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 220-21.
56
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computerized simulations of reality), and by the shrewd
exploitation of that confusion by savvy advertisers; politicians,
and lawyers alike.6o

. In the second place, Sherwin argues, Americans now know
that irrational forces play a si · -"cant role in httman conduct.
As "a variety of irrational forces flood into consciousness,"
11
Sherwin notes, {t]he contingencies of fate, chance, fury, and
desire threaten to overwhelm the mind, oppressing it with
feelings of helpless passivity."61
Sherwin is concerned that in response to these consciously
known. indeterminate epistemological realities of the
postmodern condition, American juries and judges are
increasingly unconsciously adopting what he describes as the
11
11
skeptical postmodemism ... strategy" of either (adopting a
posture of] bemused irony"62 or "diving into the flow, in a
11
triut11ph of Sadean or Nietzschean rapture. 63 For Sherwin,
11
however, the "grim dilemma 64 posed by the two prongs of the
interpretative skeptical postmodernism strategy for legal
orderin,g is an "unnecessary and illusory" type of "hobson's
choice."65 According to Sherwin's thesis~ "there is a middle
way, a way in which opposing forces and disparate modes of
knowing, · · g, and talking interpenetrate· in varied and
1
complex fashion."66 Sherwin's ' middle way" is attainable
through what he calls an "affirmative postmodem.
ld. In sum, as the modernist benchmark for ideal truth and objectivist
rationality glves way to constructivist insights; the task of judgment becomes a
far more complicated matter~ For rtow the search for objective truth must give
way to the task of choosing among competing warrants for a variety of disparate
truth claims. ld.
61 ld. Indeed, as Sherwin asserts:
Faced with an onslaught of uncontrollable forces both within and.
without, the subject faces a crisis of identity and a foreboding sense that
individual agency itself may no longer make sense. For how can one
expect to direct events or even control one's own actions when irrational
forces like chance and desire mock the best efforts of deliberation and
intentionality?
I d.
62 This strategic choice, according to Sherwin, entails a more. or less stable
posture of guarded detachment, to defend against the duel dangers of incessant
-deception on the one hand and destabilizing incoherence on the other. Id. (emphasis
added).
63 Id.
64 . The dilemma consists, in Sherwin's view, of an either/ or strategic
interpretative choice of the following: to play (or at least bemusedly watch) the
manipulative games of language or to leap beyond language into the primary,
incommunicable flux of irrational forces that surround and irif.use our words and
images. Jd. at 221.
65 ld.
66 ld.
60
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perspective."67 'I'his perspective is an embellishment of what
Ernst Cassirer, in his 1946 book Language and Myth, termed
"mature constructivism."68 As Sherwin posits:
In the postmodem era we are burdened with the awareness
that we live within forms of knowledge and belief that we both
inherit and create. Thus, unlike those who dwelled among the
Homeric myths, we know that the mythic forms in which we
live, that establish our world, are subject to critical scrutiny.
They may be deliberately affirmed or disavowed. The
responsibility for meaning operates on both a collective
(cultural) and an individual (cognitive) level. We needn't accept
the proffered warrants for enchantment. But we may. The question,

therefore, is not Whether we should be suspicious of enchantment.
Rather, we must ask under what conditions should .suspicion as

opposed to belief prevail ?69
In essence, therefore, Sherwin conceives of the problem of
persuasion in a postmodem socie,ty, like early 21st century
America, as the burden we all bear. This burden,
mythologically linked to the story of Adam and Eve, who
sampled the forbidden fruit of The Tree of Knowledge is one of
too much sensate, surface knowledge and too little deep
understanding.
For Sherwin, Americans, reacting to the
disenchantnient of too many theories of htJman behavior, too
many unmaskings of psychological motivation, and too much

information running through their brains have recently
armored their psyches with a "hyper-estheticized and radically
1

amoral perspective. 'i 70
This perspective is, according to
Sherwin, the modus operandi of filmmakers like Quentin
Tarantino71 and Oliver Stone, and
it is the .. skeptical
67 Id~
68

69
70

71

ld. (quoting ERNsr CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH (1946)).
ld. (emphasis added) (endnote omitted).
Id. at 224.
According to Sherwin's critical review of Tarantino:
Everything . . . comes to b~ seen as an image within a vast flux of
multiple, disparate images, a surface upon which our gaze falls seeking
a response to the. c;entral reality-defining query: how does it make me
Jeel? This is the image as commodity. If I consume it, what is its
payoff? In short, the sensation it offers is its own reward. And in that
reward lies the ortly truth we may lay claim to. It is in the context of
such a morally depleted, wholly esth.eticize'd perspective that Tarantino
may be understood when he says:
I don't take violence very seriously. I find violence funny,
especially in the stories, I've been telling recently. Violence is part
of this world and I am drawn to the outrageousness~ of real-life
1
violence. It isn t about lowering people from helicopters on to
speeding trains, or about terrorists hijacking somethirig or other.
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posbnodem defense in action" that serves to undermine our
legal and political values. 72 As Sherwin observes, the very
meaning of our public culture is endangered as exemplified in.
situations ranging
[f]rom the Sitnpson double murder trial to the constitutional
~risis
of the Clinton impeachment proceeding . . . .
Estheticized responses (what does the image make us feel?) and
estheticized judgments (how does it create that effect?) ·t hreaten to
take the place of reflective judgment (what self, social, legal and
political reality are these images constructing? to what end? how do
they make power flow? who benefits? who lose$?). The flow of
power in society is real, with real effects; it•s n·o joke. We
cannot afford to feel superior, in an ironically detached way to
the symbolic cultural forms that help to make up who we are
and the reality we live in.73

Sherwin's project on popular culture and the law, it seems,
is an extension and elaboration of Cialdini's "weapons of
irtfluence. "74 Thus, by way of illustration, Sherwin would
probably agree that American jurors and citizens will tend to
repay a·legal image maker like Johnnie Cocluan and a political
imagemeister like Bill Clinton, who makes them feel outraged,
appreciated, or justified as the case may be, with a reciprocated
verdict or vote of confidence. Likewise, Sherwin would likely
find explanatory power in the continued popularity of Bill
Clinton in spite of his . perjury and obstruction of justice,
because Clinton is a likeable character (he plays the saxophone,
enjoys fast food and rock-n-roll, and "feels our pain"), and the
electorate ·h ad committed to electing and re-electing the man in
spite of early knowledge of his colorful lifestyle. Also, the fact
that Clinton's public approval rating remained high in spite of
Real life violence 'is, you're in a restaurant and a man and his wife
are having an argument and all of a sudden that guy .gets so mad at
her, he picks up a fork and stabs her in the face. That,s really crazy
and comic bookish but it also happens •. ~ . To me, violerice is a
totally aesthetic subject.
1d. at 224-25(endnote o.mitted).
72 I d. at 226. Shel"W'in writes the following about Oliver Stone's vision:
Perceiving the real world through .. ~ a skeptical postmodem screen
turns reality into TV reality: surfaces to gaze on, to consume, for the
sake of imme.diate (albeit free-floating) gratification. This is what
filinmaker Oliver Stone seems to have had in mind when he referred to
the mass medta•s effort to arouse everywhere a fascination without
scruples resulting in a paralysis of meaning, to the profit of a single
scenario. lt is the same skeptical postmodem esthetic that prompts
audiences to laugh in the face of horror and perversion.
Id. at 225 (endnote omitted).
73 Id. at 2.26 (emphasis in original).
74 See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
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his questionable behavior was social proof that he was a "good"
president, and Clinton was masterful in using the trappings of
the Presidency (the Presidential S.eal, visual shots of him
saluting the Marine guard as he alighted from the Presidential
helicopter, and the like) to maintain his authority. Indeed,
Sherwin would tend to share Cialdini's concern about
11
uautomatic, mindless compliance in American society, "that is,
a willingness to say yes without · · ·. ing first" in the face of
''the ever-acceleratirlg pace and informational crush of
[contemporary] life"75 and affirm Cialdini's conclusion that it
11
Will be increasingly important for [American] society .. ~ to
understand the how and why of automatic influence. n 76 In this
regard, Professor Sherwin has made a si . · ·cant contribution
by providing a powerful explanation of how and why .key
actors in American legal and political systems jurors, judges
and citizens
are often automatically influenced by aesthetic
artistry of contemporary filinmakers. In the processi Sherwin
has also added to the corpus of what Mauet refers to as
11
"p·e rsuasion law": the psychology of persuasion" that
11
11
"fascinates true trial lawyers who spend a lifetime learning
about, and learning how to apply, psychology in the
courtroom. n71 Yet, Sherwin's book, which emphasizes the
influence of contemporary filmmaking on the American legal
and p·olitical ethos, also provides useful and important
explanatory insights on Monaco's call that we nlearit to read
[film] irnages well."78

B.

The Problem of Understanding and Dealing With the

.. Jurisprudence ofAppearances."
·
Sherwin provides a number of interesting and irnportant
insights in his book on what he calls "the jurisprudence of
appearances." 79 First, he conceptua]izes the crux of the
problem of the jurisprudence of appearances as •'repression [by
legal actors like judges and jurors] through unconscious
displacement onto others of illicit and thus highly unpalatable
impulses and desires."so Second, he identifies the genesis of the
problem to be the extraordinarily potent influence that
contemporary popular visual media has had on "legal meaning
75

CIALDINI,

76

Id.

supra note 27, at xiv.

n MAUET, supra note 21, at 1-2. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
7S MONACO, supra note 2, at 128.
79 SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 10.

so Id. at 9.

See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
.
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making." 81 As Sherwin notes, "When law goes pop punitive
1
retribution against the predatory other the 'alien among us,
that perennial favorite of film and TV as well as 'real' lawbecomes easy, perhaps too easy" because "legal meaning
making ... adopts the media's [seductive and confusing] visual
logic as its own.us2 In this regard, Sherwin posits a helpful
urule of thumb" and related corollary about the so-called
"visual logic" of contemporary popular culture:
Whatever the visual mass media touch bears the mark of
realityI fiction confusion. There is also a corollary to the rule:
once you enter the realm of appearances it may ·be difficult to
control how the image spins.83
·.

'I'hird, in what is no doubt one of the best parts of the book,
When Law Coes Pop offers a compelling analysis of filmmaker
11 84
Errol Morris' 1988 "so-called documentary ' film, The Thin
Blue Line, to illustrate Sherwin's concern about popular
culture's impact on American legal meaning making.. 85 Indeed,
my personal viewing and understanding of this landmark, but
hard to· get,,86 film87 was greatly enhanced by Sherwin's
commentary. The Thin Blue Line is a film that the New York
Ti·mes described as follows:
H Randall Adams.and David Harris can agree on anything, it•s
that fate dealt them a terrible hand ·w hen, on Saturday,
November 2'1, 1976, it threw them together. Mr. Ada1ns knows
that his whole life would have been different if he hadn't run
out of gas that morning, if he hadn't been hitchhikin~ and if
Mr~ Harris hadn't picked him up. Mr. Harris, who gave Mr~
Adams a ride in a car he had stolen a day earlier, wonders
what would have happened if Mr. Adams, who was living in a
seedy Dallas motel with his brother, hadn't refused to give him

.81
82

Id. at 10.
ld. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). According to Sherwin, when [law goes pop]

enters the domain of the hyper real, a realm in which appearances battle
appearances for the s~ke of appearances C and where images risk spinning out of
control. Id. at141.
83 Id. at 141.
84 .ld. at 107.
85 Errol Morris, Director, The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, 1988) (cited
in SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 107, n. 2).
86 l was able to rent the video from Facets Multi-media, Inc., 1517 West Fullerton
Ave., Chicago, IL 60614. Facets is an. incomparable video rental resource that
makes their bounty available to maihordering cus.t omers as well as the more.
traditional in-stor~ord~ring customer~. See g_enerally; Facets Compl~te Video
Catalog No. 15 (Cathenne Foley & Milos Stehlik, eds. 1999) (catalogmg over
35,000 films in assorted film categories).
87 The Thin Blue Line, despite its current obscurity, was included in The New York
Times Guide to the Best 1,DOO Movies Ever Made (ed. Peter M. Nichols 1999) at 866'
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a place to sleep.
But the lw'o men did meet and spend the day together, and
they did wind up at a drive-in where a film called Swinging
Cheerleaders was being shown. Mr. Adams, who was then a
twenty-eight-year-old drifter, says he didn't like the movie and
insisted on going home before it was over, leaving Mr. Harris
to roam on his own. 'Mr. Harris, then a sixteen-year-old
runaway, says the twosome were at the drive-in until midnight
or so. The time is crucial, because at twelve-thirty A.M. a
Dallas police officer named Robert Wood s:aw the stplen car
moving with only its parking lights on. He signaled for the car
to stop, walked over to talk to the driver, and the driver killed
h.&.L&i
rn.ss·

Sherwin devotes over thirty pages of his book to
dissecting The Thin Blue Line. The most striking .of his many
perspicacious observations about the film are the following: (1)
that "Morris' lead story irt that film made so many people
disbelieve the state's trial story that the (Texas] courts
11
eventually reexamined th.e case"89 and that this reexamination
11
led to Randall Adams' release from prison"90; (2) that the film
lays out two contemporaneous but opposing plot lines"; to wit,
nthe story as told in a classically linear fashion (be · · g,
development, conclusion), and a provocative, unresolved
nonlinear narrative"91; (3) that the fi]m "is curious in that it
88

Id. at 866.

89 SHERWIN,

supra note 3, at 107-108.

Id. at 108. Adams had served twelve years, a good part of it on death row. In
marty people's eyes Morris's film served as the key catalyst in righting a terrible
wrong. By helping to set Randall Dale Adams free the film also helped set the
Dallas criminal justice system straight. Id. (endnote· omitted).
91 Id. at 115. As Sherwin explains:
The classic linear story line is perhaps best exemplified by the familiar
genre of the detective story wherein the detective-hero, by identifying
and combining significant clues, resolves a disturbing mystery. In
1
Morris s film, the audience as detective/juror traces the clues that point
to a siniste;r plot by state officials to frame Randall Dale Adams. The
clues fit neatly into a story that ends when the mystery of the frame-up
is revealed and solved. Once revealed, the plot is obvious and familiar.
Lies, corruption, and abuse of power made Adams a scapegoat for a
crime he did not commit.
The fitm•s opposing plot line operates within the_context of a less
familiar, nonlinear (arguably posbnodem) narrative form. Rather than
offering closure, this form leaves a disquieting sense of ~dequate
resolution and residual mystery. Was Harris the gunman? If he was, is
that all there is to the story? What about the loose ends? Where was
Adams at the time of the murder? What were the two of them up to
that day? Does it take a serendipitous interview with an artful
filmmaker to save a prisoner from life in jail or death by electrocution?
What if the plotting qf chance or fate actually played a larger part in the
criminal justice system? Surely such uncontrollability of events and

90
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simultaneously enacts and refutes the classic modern narrative
of straight-arrow truth and constant justice.. 92; and (4) that "[i]n
a film about the different forms of deception, Morris leaves
room to realize that certainty often demands self-deception."93
Sherwin provides a fourth noteworthy exposition of the
jurisprudence of appearances by his discussion of how
11
contemporary visual media that combines quick gratification
through intellectual relaxation, emotional excitement, and
escapism" in its portrayal of "[l]aw stories"94 h.a s perniciously
shaped the cognitive pathways of the American public in a w.ay
that makes them vulnerable to manipulative distortion when
making public judgments in the legal realm.. The manipulation
11
occurs, according to Sherwin, as savvy litigators with
increasing frequency emulate the popular cultural constructs
and visual storytelling techniques that dominate the culture at
11
1
large' 9s and, in the process; create a conflation of tru~ and
fiction, image and reality, fact and fantasy."96
Fifth, the jurisprudence of appearances is also played out
"outside the courtroom as well, as a growing number of
lawyers deploy the strategies of public relations using sourtd
bytes, photo-ops, and a variety of spin control tactics to win
their cases in the court of public opinion/' 97 to affect the course
of litigation and the legal rulings in a case.98 Thus, Sherwin
explains how "(w]ith the advent of litigation public relations
we see how legal advocates exploit the visual mass media's
tendency to blur the line between reality and fiction. "99
Finally, Sherwin discerns a "cultural crisis'' in what he
comprehends as the jurisprudence of appearances run amok.
He writes:
[Legal and political spinmasters'] wi11ingness to use the media
to manipulate desire; to conflate fantasy and reality, and to
merge self-identity with self-gratifying acts of consumption
regardless of whether the commodity consumed is a product, a
political candidate, or a matter of law is contributing to a
human actions dissipates in rather short order, the complacent all's right
with the world because truth and justice will out in the end attitude that
the linear story would have us believe.
Id. (endnote omitted).
92 I d. at 116-17.
93 Id. at 121.
94 Id. at 143.
95 Id. at 146.
96 Id.
w Id.
98 Id. at 148-150.
99 Id. at 152.
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significant cultural crisis. Powerful irrational forces seem to be
irrupting all around us. Chance events and uncontrollable
impulses threaten to subvert rational explanation, throwing
causation itseH into doubt. New forms of associative thinking

and disparate logics are eroding conventional notions of
modern reason and the autonomous self. An emerging sense
of contingency of the historical, cultural and psychological
constructedness of self and social reality is making it harder to

agree upon shared moral and ethical standards for community
life.lOO

C.

The Problem of Popular Culture's Illicit Impact on Legal

Advocacy
In Sherwin's view, as expresse.d in When Law Goes Pop, it is
highly problematic to the proper functioning of law that
contemporary pop culture arouses illicit, secret, and
unexamined impacts on American jurisprudence. He sums up
his concern in this area by arguing:
The convergence of law and popular culture . . . provides an
account of increasing distortions within the discourse
competencies of both the public and the judiciary. It alsQ
s.u ggests a growing irrtbalance in the distribution of various
discourse competencies within the legal system as a whole. A
synergistic convergence of skeptical postmodem theory,
communications technology, and the insistent gratification
demands of the marketplace is leading to a flattening out of
disparate discourse competencies. Common sense and to an
increasing extent legal discourse and knowle,d ge are showing
signs of collapsing into· the same. gratification-based esthetic
that dominates contemporary popular culture. It is precisely
this distortion that [exists] . . . with the advent of the
jurisprudence of appearances and the litigation public relations
movement. As a result, the discrete virtues of popular
knowledge and discourse, like those of the judiciary, which
must at times operate as a brake upon popular opinion, are
being encumbered and diminished.1o1

Professor Sherwin suggests, in other words, that the.
distorting affect of popular culture's unexamined impact on
11
legal reasoning is up for grabs: causation, the autonomy and
moral responsibility of the individual, and the coherence of
reason itself."102 Moreover, this crisisi in Sherwin's view,
11
represents the foremost legal challenge of our time~ "103
Sherwin, however, urges a rather ambiguous remedy to
this ''crisis."
He argues that "[w]e must begin to
too Id. at 168-169.
tm Id. at 240-41.
102 Jd. at 169.
103

Id.
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reconceptualize and relegitimize law in a way that is consonant
with current lived realities, which is to say, with the cultural
constructs and anxieties actually circulating in society."104 If we
take this path, Sherwin tells us, the "effort will lead us from
hyper-catharsis to real catharsis in the face of tragic suffering
and the affirmative potential of legal enchantment. "105
It is difficult, however, to find a clear explanation of how
Sherwin w·o uld specifically change things. Ultimately, it
see,ms, Sherwin advocates a return to ancient classical
rhetorical principles as a cure for our crisis of legal meaningmaking.106 The following excerpt, while general and idealistic,
is Sherwin's best articulation in When Law Goes Pop of his
solution:
I believe that [my] affirmative postmodern perspectiye ... has
much in common with [a] pre-Platonic perspective.
Postmodern constructivist insights have shown us in a broad
range of social and cultural and even scientific contexts that the
particular form of expression-the discourse, the metaphor,
the visual image that is used -is essential to the kind of truth
that may be expressed. This is not to say that truth is reducible
to esthetics, that content equals style, as the fifth-century
Gorgian Sophists and their contemporary skeptical
postmodern counterparts seem to believe. Rather, it is to
acknawledge the .complexity, contingency, and multiplicity of truth
and reason. It is to accept the interpenetration of truth, morality,
and esthetics as well as of reason and the irrational in all its varied
forms and disguises. And it is to affirm responsibility for choosing
among the disparate claims to truth and reason that confront us
when conflicts demand resolution. ·

•

On this view it becomes apparent that we share a deep insight
with rhetoricians like !socrates and Philip Sidney. Without the
fictional method, without the efficacy of verisimilitude, and the
motivating power of emotion, truth. may sirnply fail to come to
life in the mind107•

On the one hand, Sherwin's suggested approach is
worthwhile because it tries to imaginatively synthesize
theoretical parallels between pre-Platonic rhetoricians and
present 21st century post-modem cultural practices. On the
other hand the lingering generality of its · prescription for .
reform is reminiscent of other recent, trendy, somewhat.
shallow calls for reform that we, for example, "Act for the best,
104

10s

Id.
Id.

See id~ at228. It may be that current developments in culture, technology, and
the history of ideas have led us to a fork irt the road similar to the one Plato
faced. Id.

106

to7

Id. at 229.
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hope for the best, and take what comes. n1os

lll. 'fHE NATURE OF AES'I'HETIC-LEGAL JUDGMENT IN A
CULTURE OF LAW
Despite its abstract and jargon-infused quality109, V\lhen
Law Goes Pop has a si · · icant redeeming aspect it is a creative
11
contribution to what one legal theorist has called the key issue
in legal scholarship today," 11o which is the indeterminacy
debate about whether law or things outside of the law
"determine the outcome of particular legal disputes."llt
Rooted in a philosophy that posits that the rule of law is
not radically £nterdeterminate, but rather moderately
underdetermined (by 'SUch factor~. as political ideology, class
background, racial and gender identification and the like);112
the singular si . · ·cance of Professor Sherwin's book, When Law
Goes Pop, is that it urges the incorporation of aesthetic judgment
into the calculus of how law should determine human
disputes. As such, Sherwin extends and elaborates the recent
p~th breaking work of Professor Paul W. Kahn, who in The
Cultural Study of Law113 called for "a legal aesthetic" consisting
11
of a Kantian-inspired Study of the time and spa~ce within
which legal experience, both belief and practice-; becomes
possible." 114
·
The crux of Sherwin's original contribution to the cultural
study of law is his melding of the insight that there exists
multiple forms of "truth'' in postmodern America, including the
11
critical truth" of irrational emotion, with his plea for an
11
American "tragic wisdom gestalt that would serve to ..,cultivate

108

ALAN C!' HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NONFOUNDATIONALIST
ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATibN 331 (2000) (internal quotation marks

omitted; endnotes omitted).
t09 See supra note 17 and accom.panying text.
no Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1990).
111 Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
112 Id. at 489-99.
tt3 KAHN, supra note 1.
114 I d. at 40. Kahn went on to note:
The rule of law is an organization of institutions, practices, persons and
objects within the ongoing historical and spatial project that is the state.
The state occupies time and space not as an object in the natural world,
but as an imaginative construction of tempered and spatial meanings.
The state•s time is history; its space is territory. These are the subjects of
a legal aesthetic.
I d.
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our capacity for enchantm.ent." 115 "Enchantment," for Sherwin,
connotes the requisite social and institutional maturity to
transmogrify the conflict of necessary le-g al rituals into
sufficient symbolic cultural meanings.t16
When Law Goes Pop is important because, at its heart, it
polemically applies two valuable theoretical constructs to the
study of law · one from the field of personal psychology, the
other from art. First; Sherwin makes out a convincing; albeit
implicit, case that "the struggle for meaning, .. which Bruno
Bettelheim examined on the personal aesthetic level in the his,
book The Uses of Enchantment, needs to be taken up by the
American legal system.117 Sherwin's book, indeed, resonates
with the following excerpt from Bettelheim's monumental
work:
If we hope to live not just from moment to moment,. but in true
consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and
most difficult ac.h ievement is to find meaning in our lives. It ~
well known how many have lost the will to live, ·a nd have
stopped trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not suddenly
acquired at a particular age; not even when one has reached
chronological maturity. On the contrary, gaining a secure
understanding of what the meaning of one's life may or ought
to be this is what constitutes psychological maturity. And this
achievement is the end result of a long development ....

Contrary to the ancient myth, wisdom does not burst forth
-fully developed ~e Athena out of Zeus's headi it is built up,
small step by small step, from most irrational beginnings.11s

Second, Sherwin has created a vision of the flottrishlng of
the American legal system by his call for a sophisticated
collective consciousness that incorporates "a symbolic as well
as a practical dimension to legal adjudication"lt9 and his
implicit agreement with the aesthetic theory of James Joyce's
character, Stephen Dedalus, in the book Portrait of the·Artist as a
11
120
Young Man.
The Joycean theory is that "true art should seek
to achieve objective stasis through "wholeness, harmony, and
121
radiance," not subjective kinesis 'Of desire or loathing. .
tts

SHERWIN, supra

note 3, at 230.
116 Id. Sherwin observes: Culhtre~ like art and ... law cannot flourish without.
the enchantment of esthetics, what the ancient Greeks called terpsis. Id.
117

BRUNO BETfELHEIM, THE USFS OF ENCHANTMENT: THE ME;ANING AND

IMPORTANCE OF FAIR)' TALES (1977).
ltS Id. at 3~
119 SHERWIN,
120
121

supra note 3, at 230.

}AMES JOYCE, PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN (1916).
See generally 'WILUAM YORK TINDALL, A READER'S GUIDE TO JAMES JOYCE 94-100
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Sherwin, then, would urge American judges and jurors to
deploy their post-mode.m aesthetic judgment, stimulated by
their exposure to fi1.nt media, not to satisfy subjective fears and
wishes but, rather, to achieve a coherent social co-n ception of
justice in an individual case.
--

IV. CONCLUSION
Richard Sherwin's V\lhen Law Goes Pop, while difficult to
read and decipher because of its repetitive use of abstract
jargon, is, nonetheless, a fascinating and valuable contribution
to the cultural stu.d y of law. Sherwin raises a number of
interesting issues including the problem of persuasion in a
post-modern society, the problem of understanding and
11
dealing with the jurisprudence of appearances," and the
problem of ·p opular culture's illicit impact on legal advocacy.
The most significant aspect of When Law Goes Pop, how·ever, is
its endorsement of aesthetic-legal judgment to achieve deep
cultural meaning in 21st century America.

(1959).

